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6NATO Strategy - Building the Comprehensive Approach 
Whether or not one believes that NATO’s future is depend-ent upon the success of its ISAF mission in Afghanistan, it is clear that NATO’s overwhelming priority in 2009 is to obtain more and better results from the massive effort in 
manpower and money that it has made in that country since 2003.  Noth-
ing succeeds like success but this is several years off in Afghanistan, given 
that this country is in a far worse state of destruction and dilapidation than 
anything the Alliance ever encountered in the Balkans.  It has to be built, 
rather than rebuilt, and virtually from scratch.  As the Allies already expe-
rienced in intervening in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, a real and 
lasting impact is only achieved when NATO leaders realise that there is no 
cheap, quick-fix solution and resolve to put the resources at NATO’s disposal to do the job properly.  
An early conclusion is that nothing happens without security and that it is difficult to do both secu-
rity and reconstruction simultaneously in the hope that the one will have a positive impact on the 
other.  In truth, as ISAF’s experience has shown, security has to be countrywide and felt very much 
at the local level before any major and lasting reconstruction can go ahead.  The local Afghans tend 
to prefer to sit on the fence and wait to see who will emerge as the clear winner.  Although it will 
be unpalatable for those Allies who have branded their contribution to ISAF essentially in terms of 
reconstruction and development to acknowledge that the operation is increasingly concentrating on 
counter-insurgency and preventing Taliban infiltration from Pakistan, there really seems to be little 
choice if Kabul and the international community are to preserve all the progress of recent years in 
education, democracy building, women’s rights and infrastructure refurbishment.  Those national-
ist Taliban elements who are not beholden to Al Qaeda will not give up the fight unless they are 
convinced they cannot succeed and the Afghan government is able to negotiate from a position of 
strength.  
No one can contest that Afghanistan needs a civilian surge to help with governance, police reform, 
alternative livelihoods to poppy production and the like.  Ultimate success, as elsewhere, depends 
on the military focus of peace building progressively giving way to civilian reconstruction and Af-
ghan ownership of residual security tasks.  But we are obviously far from this stage yet and moving 
prematurely to the civilian surge at the expense of deploying more US and NATO troops would be 
prejudicial to NATO’s ultimate success.  At this stage, it would not be fair to say that troop levels are 
adequate or that a civilian contribution has, pro rata, the equivalent value of an additional manoeu-
vre battalion, medivac helicopter or OMLT (the operational mentoring and liaison teams that train 
the Afghan National Army).  Counter-insurgency experts frequently point out that NATO has far 
fewer forces in Afghanistan per head of the population than it ever had in the Balkans (the interna-
tional aid per capita is also a fraction of the Balkans level).  Moreover, around a hundred “caveats” 
or operational restrictions imposed by contributing nations limit the use to which the troops that 
are sent can be put, further fuelling debates about burden sharing and prompting the US Secretary 
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7of Defense Gates to warn of a “two tier Alliance”.  At a time when the incoming Obama Adminis-
tration is reviewing the overall Alliance strategy in Afghanistan and pledging to increase US troop 
levels by some 30,000 in 2009 alone, it will be difficult for the European Allies not to match this 
effort through additional force contributions of their own.  The problem, in this regard, is that many 
Europeans, such as the UK, France and Poland, already surged their forces in 2008 under the Bush 
Administration, thereby not leaving them with much room for manoeuvre in 2009.
The problem in the long run for NATO is not, however, essentially one of military deployment, no 
matter how useful it would be for Allies to lift their caveats, find more enablers such as helicop-
ters and engineering units and reorganize ISAF to be more of a theatre-wide task force and less an 
amalgam of national units more or less concentrated on their provincial bases of operations.  The 
real problem is that success in Afghanistan is largely outside NATO’s control, even if it runs a text 
book military operation.  Achieving security especially in the south will only be feasible if the other 
major institutions, such as the UN, the EU and the World Bank, accord Afghanistan the same priority 
as NATO currently does; and are ready and able to push ahead with governance and reconstruction 
as soon as the Alliance has stabilized the security environment.  In the past it has proved easier for 
these other institutions to obtain contributions from NATO (for instance for the UN in Kashmir, or 
the EU in Bosnia for its EUFOR deployment) than vice-versa.  
The “comprehensive approach” of major institutions and civilian and military players working closely 
together is now NATO’s official doctrine for all non-Article 5 missions, but contrary to NATO’s past 
experience with transformation, it has proved easier to postulate in theory than to implement in 
practice.  Organizations prefer to coordinate than to be coordinated.  The Afghan aid effort has 
been described by Richard Holbrooke as the most wasteful, duplicated and uncoordinated effort 
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8he has witnessed in a lifetime of dealing with internal conflicts.  Moreover, the military and civilian 
cultures are still far apart, making coordination on the ground difficult.  The experience of Afghani-
stan will undoubtedly lead over time to the US and other 
Allies investing more in civilian reconstruction expertise 
and rapid response civilian capabilities able to operate 
for long periods in dangerous areas.  But this will take 
time as well as resources, leaving the comprehensive 
approach as a work in progress as far as the ISAF mission 
in Afghanistan is concerned.  One of the most useful 
things that Barack Obama can do for NATO is not only to 
increase US forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan 
but also to use some of his international political capital 
to persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan to cooperate more 
closely on cross-border security and the UN, EU, World 
Bank and other actors to put Afghanistan higher up their 
priority list.  This said, the willingness of the Allies to 
come together on Afghanistan in 2009 and to develop 
an effective counter-insurgency strategy together with 
Pakistan will go some way towards calming the internal 
situation within the Alliance.
Of equal importance will be the willingness of the Allies to contribute extra forces on a temporary 
basis to secure the Afghan elections in August which are needed not only to lock in the democratic 
gains of 2003-4 but also to reinvigorate the political process in Afghanistan.  Additional funds and 
equipment as well as trainers are also needed if NATO is to meet its goal of forming a robust Afghan 
National Army able to take over major security responsibilities within six years.  Naturally it is not 
easy for Allies to countenance extra spending on two fronts at the same time – for more NATO 
troops as well as a larger ANA Trust Fund and training programme.  But, as so often in the past, the 
willingness to spend more for a short period is the key to recouping savings and force reductions in 
the medium term.
Afghanistan will be a long and winding road but the urgent need is for the Allies to break the sense 
of deadlock and stalemate in the fight against the Taliban in the south, even if, as General Petraeus 
has pointed out, the security situation may get worse before it gets better.  NATO publics will not 
stay the course unless they sense that NATO has turned the strategic corner against the Taliban.  A 
clear publicly articulated strategy based on realistic and attainable objectives and a clearly articu-
lated political framework to reconcile Afghans will be key to this objective.  The US in particular will 
need to hear from the Europeans that they are in Afghanistan because preventing the re-emergence 
of Al Qaeda’s training camps is in their fundamental security interest as well.  Too frequently the Eu-
ropeans imply that they are in Afghanistan first and foremost to prove their loyalty to NATO and the 
Americans.  Solidarity is a fine thing, but NATO operations that are based more on a sense of mutual 
obligation rather than on shared threats and security interests are unlikely to be successful.
United States  24,900
United Kingdom  8,300
Germany  3,460
Canada   2,830
France   2,780
Italy   2,350
Natherlands  1,770
Poland   1,590
Australia  1,090
Major ISAF Force Contributors
Source: www.nato.int/isaf
